Two decades after the Cold War, the political traditions of Left and Right were widely deemed to have fossilised. Many saw them as unable to express vital alternatives, and only distantly related to contemporary political life. This article examines how far this remains true in the light of more recent upheavals. It looks at the key divisions of opinion to have emerged from the 2008-economic crisis, identifying important differences concerning in what sense it a crisis (the production of disorder vs of injustice) and how it can be explained (acts of moral or intellectual transgression vs a pattern of adhesion to problematic doctrines and practices). It goes on to argue these differences can be seen as extensions of older Left-Right dichotomies, albeit articulated with a second division between technical and normative reasoning. The article concludes with a discussion of the challenge political actors face in positioning themselves coherently according to these divisions.
Moments of political and socio-economic crisis are an interesting time to explore ideological change, being commonly the catalyst to a rupture in belief. 1 cast by many as moribund. 3 A moment of crisis acts as a critical test then: is the decay of the old framework confirmed, or is it set to re-emerge in new colours?
In what follows, taking Europe as my target of study, I argue the Crisis has indeed produced important dichotomies, centred on key questions to do with in what sense the situation is actually a crisis and how one should understand its origins. I propose a key distinction on each point: as regards the nature of the Crisis, between those who emphasise the disorder it engenders and those who emphasise its contribution to injustice, and as regards its origins, between those who emphasise acts of moral or intellectual transgression vs a longterm pattern of adhesion to problematic doctrines and practices. These dichotomies can be seen as extensions and reconfigurations of older Left-Right dichotomies, as I seek to show.
Yet at the time of writing they remain focused on retrospective diagnosis rather than forwardlooking prescription, as we see when trying to identify meaningful differences as regards how the Crisis might be overcome. To that extent they are somewhat flimsy ideological formations -half-formed, possibly transitional.
As this summary indicates, my strategy is to seek to map the divisions the Crisis is producing and only then in a second step to examine whether these can be related to earlier distinctions conventionally regarded as of a Left-Right kind. The aim is to establish whether one can plausibly arrive at a Left-Right dichotomy via a set of intermediary categories more intimately linked to the context in question. An alternative approach, proceeding in reverse, would be to start from the assumption that 'Left' and 'Right' have an empirical referent in today's world (identifiable e.g. by recourse to the self-definitions of political actors and the lineages of political thought) and move on to examine the impact of the Crisis on the configurations these terms describe (e.g. the changing fortunes of political parties). There is an important methodological choice to be made here, and the prior approach seems superior in several ways. First, it leads us to formulate an argument engaging directly with the sceptical position there are no meaningful Left-Right divisions today. It requires us to examine what, if anything, forms the substance of political oppositions -to build them from the ground upwards, as it were, minimising the extent to which we simply infer them by extrapolating from times past. Second, it is well suited to the fact that political thinkers and actors in today's world often avoid using the terms Left and Right. If our task is to uncover oppositions which are not presented explicitly in Left-Right terms, it makes sense to avoid the premature application of this vocabulary. Third, such an approach allows us to avoid suggesting the LeftRight framework is exhaustive: we can examine whether there exist divisions of a Left-Right kind without feeling compelled to deny there may be others which are not of this kind, and which may require alternative schemes of representation. 4 Attempting this type of overview poses obvious challenges. First, we are in the middle of a potentially transformative moment. The meanings of Left-Right are likely to be unsettled, and we lack the historian's perspective. Second, even if we acknowledge our observations are provisional, it may be impossible to tell a general story of Europe as a whole. No doubt the dominant political oppositions vary across countries; but even within any given setting, they will be different for people of different political persuasion, for definitions are themselves a political matter. So one should expect no consensus on these questions, and an account such as the following must be selective. But these challenges should not deter us -indeed, there is a sense in which it is more feasible to attempt this type of general analysis in times of crisis than calm. Crises are shaped by landmark events which produce common sets of reference-points for those who experience them, and which may thus lend structure to political disagreement. It is in such moments, if at all, that it is valid to seek broad patterns in the contours of political division.
Competing Diagnoses of the Crisis
Situations of societal upheaval are, as we have noted, often the spur to the differentiation of political opinion. At the most general level, one may connect this to the way a sense of crisis tends to produce a felt need for diagnosis and prescription. Situations of disturbance call for the intervention of opinion: this idea is present in the medical origins of the concept of crisis, and persists in its social and political applications. 5 That such opinion will appear in plural form is not given, at least in the short term: as the social psychologists tell us, under the pressure of novel events the phenomenon of 'group-think' -a heightened concern for consensus and mistrust of alternatives -may be accentuated. 6 While typically associated with small, cohesive groups, it can characterise political communities as a whole in moments of great stress, e.g. in the early phases of war. But over a period of time one can expect some kind of differentiation to follow, especially insofar as the crisis is held to persist.
Once a situation has been defined as a crisis -a point on which there may be plenty of initial dispute -several concerns are likely to weigh on those involved. I regard these as general to most crisis situations of the modern age -they are core issues on which opinion is very likely to form -though they will of course be supplemented by others in the particular instance. We can express them in the form of three questions. When coupled with a concern for injustice, it may be phrased as a critique of moral conducte.g. of the greed and irresponsibility of certain sectors of society, the corruption and selfinterest of politicians, or a more general dislocation of elites from popular moral codes and everyday concerns. Either way, one sees criticisms addressed to a wide range of actors of state and economy for having deviated from that which is expected of them. The second line of thinking, in contrast to a focus on transgression, locates the origins of the Crisis in conformity to a wider set of practices which are themselves problematic. It is the pattern, not the deviation from it, which is the source of misadventure. A critique of adhesion thus forms the basis of such accounts. As that to which adhesion is displayed, these narratives generally evoke a combination of material structures, the incentives they produce, and the ideas underpinning them. Concepts such as the market, capitalism and neoliberalism tend to figure prominently.
Coupled with a concern for disorder, one can expect arguments of the kind that the market has internal contradictions, necessitating sustained intervention to avoid breakdown or the search for alternative economic models. Coupled with a concern for injustice, the focus is likely to be on unfair distributions of resources, forms of domination and exploitation by the powerful, and the alienating effects of commodification and market competition.
With these distinctions we are able to conceive, in abstract form, four strands of opinion concerning diagnosis of the Crisis, expressed in tabular form below. They are not quite mutually exclusive -one can hold that the Crisis produces injustice and disorder at the same time, and has its origins in some combination of transgression and adhesion -but they entail quite distinct points of emphasis and hybrid positions are likely to show tensions. Let us now examine these positions in turn, looking more closely at the patterns of argument associated with them and the actors around whom they cluster.
Four Strands of Opinion on the Crisis (1) Disorder / Transgression
This can be regarded as the minimal account of the Crisis, in that it both eschews explicit evaluations of principle and locates the origins in contingent mistakes rather than structural imperatives and systematic error. It is the least critical of the status quo. The Crisis is presented essentially as a period of turbulence, something to ride out and perhaps to learn lessons from, but largely a self-contained event rather than one revealing the failure of a template. 11 'Recovery' is the outcome desired. The restoration of order is ultimately about the restoration of confidence that certain transgressions will not be repeated. Technical rather than ethical questions are to the fore, and the language used is likewise technical, raising questions we shall return to concerning the intended audience.
A leading version of the argument locates the core of the Crisis in high public and private debt, and the difficulty of pricing this debt. The attendant market uncertainty and unpredictability are said to inhibit risk assessment and the calculation of returns on investment, producing system volatility as sentiment swings sharply between 'exuberance' and caution. 12 Concerning the origins of this predicament, a central place is given to macro-economic mismanagement. Excessive public spending is highlighted. 13 The finger is pointed at governments across Europe, notably at previous incumbents, but especially at key countries of the eurozone periphery -Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. In some cases, notions of bad house-keeping mix with intimations of corruption and tax evasion -a second form of transgression. Public regulators, including international regulators, may be accused of failing -or not being allowed -to do their job properly, enabling dubious practices to continue. 14 Transgressions in the private sector may also be noted, particularly in the fields of banking and credit rating. 15 However, given such accounts do not impugn the fundamentals of the system, they tend to be advanced by those sympathetic to the monetarist and private-sector-oriented economic model generally considered ascendant on the eve of the Crisis. Their critics tend to refer to them as 'neoliberals': the label is useful, but it should be noted that only sometimes are we dealing with unqualified advocacy of free-market economics. Often the hostility towards state intervention is more selective and domain-specific than the purist would demand. 16 This diagnosis of the Crisis has been fairly dominant in Europe's political institutions, notwithstanding the local variations a more microscopic investigation would reveal. It has been articulated by governing party elites, officials of the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, as well as by many opposition parties. In treating the Crisis as the consequence of mismanagement, illdiscipline and imprudence, the suggestion is that the pre-Crisis order was not inherently unstable, but rather that it is in need of perfecting.
As far as policy-making prescription goes, if over-spending and dubious investing was the cause of the Crisis, this is where reforms must be targeted. The reduction of public spending is prescribed, with the centre-piece of these efforts being the 'austerity'
programmes of balancing state budgets through cuts in expenditure, especially in the 'unproductive' field of social welfare. A crucial element in these moves is the effort to restrict the agency of those deemed to have provoked the Crisis: this means a degree of banking sector reform, but in particular the limiting of policy options available to eurozone governments -hence the 'debt brake' spending restraints introduced with the 2012 Fiscal
Compact. Reassuring major investors of the soundness of public finances and states' capacity to bear existing debts is presented as necessary for the restoration of system stability. Although the diagnosis of the Crisis is minimal in the sense indicated, it may nonetheless lead to quite radical calls for change -albeit conceived as reforming the preexisting model rather than revoking it. It is change as intensification rather than substitution. Concerns to do with efficiency trump those to do with justice, and the moral condemnation of market outcomes is likely to be deemed superfluous given it supposes alternatives which do not exist. Though one finds some important variations -notably concerning how determinedly to pursue low inflation -generally it is technical reforms for the sake of greater system stability which are sought.
(2) Injustice / Transgression
This position resembles the previous in its focus on mistakes: it locates the origins of the problem in human transgression rather than in the demands of an anonymous system. It is generally sympathetic to the market in its undistorted form. But it pairs this stance with a more ethically involved perspective.
One of the prime expressions of this view has been amongst thinkers generally characterised as communitarian-conservative (or 'one-nation' conservative), as found in the media and to some degree party politics. A clear instance was a July 2011 newspaper article by the British conservative journalist Charles Moore, widely disseminated in Britain and beyond. 17 . Under the title 'I'm starting to think that the Left might actually be right',
Moore argued 'that a system purporting to advance the many has been perverted in order to enrich the few.' Moral outrage, in contrast to a merely technical concern to restore order, is characteristic of this piece and the many like-minded interventions which followed. 18 A widespread 'demoralisation' or 'moral disintegration' are at the heart of the Crisis for these conservative thinkers -be it the behaviour and morality of those at 'the bottom', who have lived beyond their means or who break the law, or those at 'the top' such as bankers and politicians, beset by greed or vainglory. 19 There is a concern to foreground the interests of 'society', as distinct from the interests of the market actor or the state. 20 Similar ideas have been prominent around Europe: in Germany, a largely sympathetic follow-up piece was published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung quoting Moore's title as its own. 21 Rather than seek to defend the policies of Europe's ruling elites, the author calls for a renewed 'bourgeois' critique of unrestrained markets. It is the middle classes who are to be valorised, in contradistinction to the wealthy beneficiaries of austerity.
Similar sentiments can be found in the Christian Democratic tradition, notably as articulated by a prominent member of the German CDU (Erwin Teufel) who, like Moore, urges the need to reconnect with the everyday concerns of the majority. 22 The necessary remoralisation of the party's politics takes religious form: it involves rediscovering the 'C' in the CDU. 23 Again, sympathetic newspaper and blog commentaries have followed. 24 While these communitarian arguments display local variations, they are clearly distinct from our previous category. The distance from the broadly neoliberal position seems clear:
it is the difference between a Thatcherite 'greed is good' and a moralising 'greed is bad'. European integration is not opposed outright, there may be calls to shrink the extension of 'Europe' to a core of the morally upstanding -that is, the economically prudent.
(3) Disorder / Adhesion
This category is populated by those who see the Crisis in mainly technical rather than normative terms -focusing in the first instance on its implications for the functioning of a system -and yet who see the origins of the turbulence as deeper than mere transgression.
In a variety of ways, it is argued that the Crisis arose from adhesion to a faulty framework, be this active commitment to an erroneous economic doctrine, acquiescence in the build-up of structural imbalances, or conformity -perhaps scarcely willed -to a set of fundamental, socio-economic 'laws'. Many such perspectives have something of a minority, ivory-tower quality -too critical for policy-makers, who are likely to see themselves as working within narrower constraints, yet too dry for mass appeal. But though their natural constituency may be small, they are an intellectually substantial array.
One such line of thought is to be found amongst demand-side economists, for whom the Crisis is a reflection of major imbalances in the economy and the distorted rationality features in the subtitle of a key publication, the focus is generally on questions of functionality rather than the values in play.
The work of contemporary Marxist economists also deserves mention, as voiced at various public workshops and forums. 31 Some share with the aforementioned an analysis of the Crisis centred on the rise of finance capitalism, increasing inequalities, low demand, and the unsustainable credit mechanisms designed to cope with these tendencies. 32 Others focus rather on the implications of technological change and a decline in profitability. 33 Common to them, and in sharp contradistinction to our previous two categories, is the emphasis on long-term trends and associated patterns of behaviour as the generators of the Crisis. Again, these Marxist accounts are quite technical: normative concerns surely underlie them, but are not the focus of analysis, and insofar as some texts show a tendency towards historical determinism, normative questions become epiphenomenal.
Not all such diagnoses of the Crisis yield policy prescriptions: some address the likely future trajectories of the economic system in a quite structuralist fashion, with only rather general remarks on human agency and technological innovation. 34 But several more immediate proposals can be heard: as 'programmes that address fundamental structural problems of capitalism today', the Euromemorandum group calls for public investment (nationally and through the European Investment Bank), banking reform, taxes on wealth and financial transactions, a coordinated wage policy, industrial policy aimed at developing the European periphery, a reduction in working hours, the creation of a publicly-owned ratings agency, and other moves away from free-market economics and the associated emphasis on competitiveness, deregulation and privatisation. 35 Calls for minimum wages (national or global), a basic income for all citizens, and the reduction of dependence on fossil fuels (cf. the 'Green New Deal') are also to be heard. 36 They are technical remedies, not packaged for ease of public consumption.
(4) Injustice / Adhesion
The final category combines far-reaching accounts of the origins of the Crisis, centred on macro-level patterns rather than contingent choices, with attention to its normative implications. These views come in a variety of forms -sometimes centred on a critique of the market, finance and big business while the role of the state is discounted or celebrated;
sometimes including a critique of the state as reproducing wider power relations. Such differences echo older divisions between socialists and anarchists. While there is some affinity with category (3), these strands are distinct from those previously examined.
Socialist and social-democratic parties, as well as social movements, are the key places where such arguments may be found (in many cases in parallel with elements of position (1) and (2) the injustices it has spawned. 'Good times did not mean we had a good economic system.
We changed the fabric of our country but we did not do enough to change the values of our economy.' He explicitly rejects moves by the Conservatives to blame contemporary crises (including the August 2011 riots as well as economic decline) merely on lax moral standards: 'I'm not with the Prime Minister [Cameron] . I will never write off whole parts of our country by calling them sick. We are not a country of bad people but great people.
[…] But with such great people, how have we ended up with the problems we face? It's because of the way we have chosen to run our country. Not just for a year or so but for decades.' Long-term adhesion to mistaken practices lies at the heart of the Crisis. Such a perspective is not wholly structuralist -blame can still be apportioned to those who had the In terms of prescription, these perspectives tend to be associated with calls for farreaching structural change not unlike those outlined under category (3). The systematic redistribution of wealth and productive resources is a prominent goal, as many of the Occupy movements have called for. 38 The austerity policies promoted by and through the EU are opposed, even if the principle of European policy-making may be endorsed. If there is an additional element distinctive from category 3, it lies in an emphasis on political participation and democratic decision-making. One sees calls for the extension of democratic practices into spheres of life where they are currently weak or excluded (e.g. the workplace, institutions of macro-economic management), alongside the development of cooperative rather than competitive economic structures. Fighting injustice is presented as a project to be pursued through inclusion and mobilisation. Notions of 'civil society' may be invoked here, bearing a certain resemblance to ideas we have discussed under heading (2).
Four families of opinion emerging in response to the Crisis have been described in this section, and can be entered into our There is, in other words, a fractal-like quality to these distinctions, and they should not be thought of in absolutist terms. inequality. Its diagnosis of the Crisis locates it mainly in human error, suggesting that equality of distribution, as a structural property, is accorded no major role in the functionality of the system. Likewise it is accorded no normative worth, for this is an account addressed to problems of disorder: indeed, one of the appealing qualities of the well-functioning market for adherents of this perspective may lie precisely in the possibilities for substituting exchange relations for ethical deliberation. More generally, an account centred on transgression tends towards underwriting the order whose standards it claims have been violated. To be sure, it may well idealise those standards, exaggerating the extent to which they were ever in force -it is often said that neoliberal rhetoric precedes the reality by some distance. 45 But through its denunciation of transgression, it reveals the ideal to which it is committed. We shall say more on the politics of 'austerity' in a moment. It may furthermore be noted that, if this was the main discourse of European policy-makers in the years following the outbreak of the Crisis, it coincided with the ascendancy of political parties conventionally identified as of the Right. 46 Box 2 in the table (Injustice / Transgression) can again be associated with a fairly sympathetic view of the market and a quite limited concern with inequality. Many nationalistpopulist parties of the current period focus their moral outrage on unjust rewards -e.g. the fact of supposedly lazy and crooked southern Europeans raiding the wealth of the hard-working northern taxpayer. Such narratives generally do not include calls for a more equal distribution of wealth -even where state intervention is advocated -for they are premised on the idea that people are not natural equals (that they divide between the honest hard-workers and the dishonest free-riders): the call is for the distribution of wealth to better reflect that fact. As such these may be regarded as positions of the Right. Things are a little more complex when we turn to the communitarian-conservative strands of opinion as discussed, since here one does see some kind of critique of inequality and of existing market practices. There is a clear effort to take distance from the pre-Crisis order, and an acceptance that the consequences of the Crisis are scarcely to be given normative defence. But it remains a critique of excesses of inequality and of the perversion of the market. To suggest a system has been 'perverted', as one hears Moore do, is to imply the distortion of something which in its natural state remains wholesome. While the largest inequalities are treated as unacceptable, it is emphasised that these have been generated contingently by inappropriate behaviour -the greed of financiers and the 'super-rich', the laziness of the able unemployed, the profligacy or corruption of politicians (at home or in the European South), or the carelessness of regulators. Such behaviour is not merely symptomatic of the system but constitutes a culpable choice. The benefits of the well-functioning market and of 'non-excessive' inequality in cultivating individual responsibility are affirmed. The position remains recognisably one of the Right.
Box 3 in the table (Disorder / Adhesion) captures a perspective with more to say on inequality. Although in its pure form it does not take a principled stand against inequality, it will often criticise it on functional grounds. It may be argued, for instance, that inequalities introduce inefficiencies such as low demand, due to the limited spending power of poorer classes in society, and that this makes events such as the Crisis and the associated political instabilities predictable phenomena. 47 Market innovations which stave off such crises -e.g.
the making available of credit to those on low incomes -are regarded in this view as simply exacerbating the crash when it comes. Adhesion to an economic doctrine which denied such realities is presented as one of the contributing factors to the Crisis. As we see, this position need not be wholly hostile to the market, but it is in no way indifferent to inequality, tending to treat this as a public good. It would seem to be a position of the Left.
Finally, Box 4 (Injustice / Adhesion) would likewise seem to be a leftist position. It is attuned to how existing structures systematically produce inequalities deemed normatively unacceptable. Again, commitment to an ideology which neglects this is seen to accentuate injustice. This perspective is not, to be sure, based on the thought that all inequalities are unjust, but that unacceptably large inequalities are systematically generated under the current arrangement. The political parties and social movements with whom it is generally associated are conventionally associated with the Left -albeit not all of those conventionally so positioned adopt this discourse, or adopt this discourse alone.
One concludes that the major divisions of opinion produced by the Crisis can be read in Left-Right terms. They express variations on older Left-Right themes, refracted through the prism of diagnosing the nature and origins of the Crisis. Specifically, the adhesiontransgression distinction we have described points to diverging evaluations of the market model towards which the pre-Crisis order could be seen -both by advocates and critics -as tending, and towards which the post-Crisis order might continue to move. We shall shortly complexify this observation, but for the moment it can be said that a Left-Right division of some sort is evident.
If this is so, it would seem to mark a deviation from the period immediately preceding One way to read the disorder/injustice opposition is as expressing a difference in intended audience. One can fairly argue that one set of narratives is aimed primarily at experts, being expressed in a form and vocabulary impenetrable to most and glossing over quotidian concerns, while the other is targeted at a mass public. A bifurcation of audience runs through the Left-Right scheme we have described, as reading our table along a vertical axis indicates.
This is important because it is central to the political challenge facing movements and parties in the coming years. Certain internal divisions are likely to recur, while unexpected alignments may emerge or be imputed from afar.
The disorder-centred diagnoses tend to be expressed in economic language and suppose a level of economic literacy in the addressee. Such interventions appear mainly intended to influence various kinds of elite -market investors, ratings agencies and decision-makers in government and international institutions. (This is clearest in the case of the rightist 'austerity' message, often presented explicitly by its proponents as necessary to 'reassure the markets'; but in part it is true also of the leftist alternatives, insofar as these respond to doubts amongst market actors concerning the growth-generating capacities of the austerity programme.)
Sometimes these messages seem intended to have a direct performative effect: the very fact that they are uttered by a speaker with decision-making authority can be expected to influence the behaviour of others. Sometimes, for example when voiced by academics, they may be intended to persuade more indirectly. Generally the intended audience is a specialised one however. Such narratives are rarely used to rally the voting public. If they are intended for public ears at all -and the austerity programme does have its public face -one may speculate that it is rather to de-mobilise the public, couching decisions in an inscrutable language so that they carry an air of inevitability, are weakly susceptible to public criticism, and are seen as properly the business of elites. It is a risky strategy, of course, since messages which foster public disengagement may in the longer run create the appetite for things more spicy.
The injustice-centred diagnoses by contrast seem designed to carry mass appeal. By focusing on the wrongs which the Crisis produces, and not just the inefficiencies, they introduce a note of passion. Both in their leftist and rightist manifestations, they have a populist streak to them, articulating interests said to be general (those of the people, the majority, the public, the '99%') in contrast to the vested interests of an elite. They are also at least minimally democratic, being grounded in the assumption that decision-making needs normative justification and cannot simply refer to unarguable system requirements. These critical tendencies are informed by the perception that public opinion is increasingly hostile to policies introduced by diktat as necessary responses to system imperatives. They are attempts to articulate and shape genuine dissatisfactions. Those parties which express such arguments in an unadulterated form -certain parties of Left and Right as highlighted -show evident capacity for mass mobilisation, as the Greek elections of Spring 2012 made clear. 49 The division between technical and normative discourses that runs through the LeftRight scheme is one of its characteristic features today. The Crisis coinciding with, and partly a result of, the extreme complexity of today's economic system, the opinions it has generated are marked by their embrace of complexity or refusal of it. On the Left, this internal division is soft (prescriptive ideas recur across the two clusters), 50 define 'the people' in ethno-culturalist or statist terms. In many cases, the decision whether to adopt an integrationist or separatist approach is one primarily of strategy rather than principle.
While nationalist, ethnicist or sovereigntist arguments may be appealed to, they are often secondary to a calculation of which level of engagement offers the best prospect of achieving goals of a Left-Right kind. 54 Hence the scope for disagreement with parties and movements of the same orientation, and the political challenges of transnational coordination.
Conclusion
As we examine the strands of opinion which the Crisis of 2008-has produced, we find In sum, the present moment appears to be a time of transition, one in which political ideas and the coalitions that accompany them show signs of being recast. Gramsci's famous notion of the 'interregnum' seems apposite, 55 while a less familiar point of comparison might be the rite of passage: 56 The Crisis may be thought of as a form of ritual, one that enables actors to take distance from old political identities and adopt new ones, at the same time within a framework of continuity. Many political parties find themselves pulled in competing directions by these contending currents of opinion, and a period of volatility is the likely consequence.
If political and socio-economic rupture acts as the spur to ideational differentiation, one may expect these divisions to stabilise, and ultimately fade, should the Crisis start to recede.
The legacy of a world-historical event can be seen as the temporary fixing of those political views to which it gives definition, followed by their subsequent fracturing and the fading of the divisions produced. How the Crisis will recede, and in particular who has the authority to declare that it has done so, remain unclear at the time of writing. For now and for an indefinite period, we see the moving silhouettes of political discord.
